



THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: INTERSECTING TRAJECTORIES

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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: INTERSECTING TRAJECTORIES

Sarwar A. Kashmeri

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FOREWORD

In this study, Mr. Kashmeri argues his thesis that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has evolved from a confident, mission driven Alliance with a clear objective, to an organization that appears to be in disarray, still looking for a unifying mission 20 years after its reason for creation – the Soviet Union – ceased to exist.


Mr. Kashmeri maintains that the action to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1073 against Libya is the latest in a series of demonstrations that highlight the disarray of the Alliance. He states that after weeks of preparation and increasingly optimistic statements about its readiness to enforce the UNSCR, Britain, France, and the United States chose to intervene in Libya alone. Mr. Kashmeri believes that NATO was once again sidelined as it had been after September 11, 2001 (9/11), when the United States unilaterally decided to go to war in Afghanistan. He argues that Afghanistan continues to demonstrate that, even in a deployment, NATO is far from a monolithic, efficient fighting force, since many of the allies have refused to participate in that war and, even before the end of the campaign, some are going home.

The primary question that Mr. Kashmeri attempts to answer is: So, what next for the once fabled alliance? In doing so, Mr. Kashmeri points out that during NATO's deterioration the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has deployed 27 successful military/civil missions from Africa to Asia. These include the EU Naval force off Somalia—that is twice the size of NATO's—and the EU mission to Chad that successfully deployed and

sustained a mobile fighting force of 3,800 troops thousands of kilometers from Brussels, Belgium. Mr. Kashmeri contends that through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their own foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor.

Mr. Kashmeri asserts that NATO's survival depends on its willingness to accept its reduced role and let the EU handle the day-to-day security needs of Europe and its periphery. NATO's continued existence, Kashmeri maintains, is in a supporting capacity to CSDP and in its ability to craft a relationship with CSDP that will allow North America and Europe to act militarily together, should that ever become necessary. Mr. Kashmeri believes that watching NATO fade into irrelevance would be a mistake, since it is a tried and true platform to harness the resources of North America and Europe.

In conclusion, Mr. Kashmeri suggests that it is time for NATO 2.0, a new version of NATO that fits the realities of an ever more integrated Europe in the 21st century. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning European security and defense issues.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SARWAR A. KASHMERI is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council's International Security Program and a Fellow of the Foreign Policy Association. He is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic as a specialist and commentator on transatlantic relations. Mr. Kashmeri speaks frequently before business, foreign policy, and military audiences and is a commentator on Vermont Public Radio. At the Atlantic Council he initiated and hosts the popular New Atlanticist Podcast Series—conversations with global leaders on globalization, international-business, and foreign policy. He teaches an annual course on American foreign policy at the Institute for Lifelong Education at Dartmouth College (ILEAD). Mr. Kashmeri is the author of *NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete?* (Potomac, March 2011) and *America and Europe After 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide* (3rd Ed., Potomac, September 2008). He has written numerous opinion pieces on transatlantic issues and chaired business and public policy panels. Mr. Kashmeri earned a BS in aerospace engineering and an MS in engineering from Saint Louis University, where he also taught on the faculty.

SUMMARY

This report recommends that:

- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) be bridged to the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
- The EU assume responsibility for the defense of Europe.
- NATO and CSDP continue to serve as the platform to enable the United States, Europe, and Canada to act militarily together in cases where severity of the issue calls for joint action.

The monograph recommends that these changes in the structure of Euro-Atlantic defense and security be initiated forthwith and completed within 3-5 years. It also contends that if NATO is not bridged to CSDP, NATO will become less and less relevant for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and may well fade away as a military alliance.

The recommendations are based on the author's original research and conversations with over 50 military and political leaders, as well as academics and diplomats from Europe and the United States. They include General (Ret.) Bantz J. Craddock, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); Lieutenant General (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor and CEO of The Scowcroft Group; Lieutenant General Christopher J. R. Davis, CMM, CD Canadian Military Representative to NATO; Ersin Onunduran, Professor of International Relations, Ankara University, Turkey; General Håkan Syrén, Chairman, European Union Military Committee (Brussels, Belgium); General Karl-Heinz

Lather, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, NATO (Mons, Belgium); and General Stephane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, NATO.

The author's research indicates that, through the EU's CSDP, Europeans are now capable of defending their own territory, except in extraordinary situations and threats that require a combined response from the EU, Canada, and the United States. This monograph concludes that except for these extreme eventualities, NATO should serve in a supporting role to CSDP. It states that NATO is increasingly dysfunctional, makes commitments it cannot keep, and continues to assume responsibilities that it cannot fulfill, especially given the diminishing financial resources at its disposal. The *New Strategic Concept* (Stratcon) adopted by NATO in Lisbon, Portugal, at its November 2010 Summit did not, unhappily, deal with its degenerative symptoms. Nor did the Stratcon recognize the impact of Europe's increasingly integrated foreign and security policy on NATO's future.

If CSDP and NATO are not bridged, NATO will become increasingly irrelevant to Euro-Atlantic security and then likely fade away. That would be a real tragedy. It is far from certain the Alliance could be recreated again, and NATO's fade-out would remove an important political and military link from the transatlantic relationship.

INTERLOCUTORS FOR THE REPORT

This report is partly based on a series of conversations with military, political, and academic leaders from both sides of the Atlantic. These interlocutors included:

(In alphabetical order)

From the United States:

Andrew Bacevich, Professor of International Relations and History, Boston University

Arnaud de Borchgrave, Director and Senior Advisor, Transnational Threats Project, CSIS

Bantz J. Craddock, General (Ret.), U.S. Army, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

Brent Scowcroft, Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. Air Force, former National Security Advisor; CEO, The Scowcroft Group

Charles Van Bebber, Colonel, U.S. Army, Director, European Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

Chuck Hagel, Senator, Co-Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board; Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States

Damon Wilson, Vice President and Director, International Security Program, Atlantic Council of the United States

James Hoge, Editor, *Foreign Affairs* magazine

Dr. Larry Goodson, Professor, Middle East Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

Leo G. Michel, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Marc Grossman, Vice Chairman, The Cohen Group;
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Michael C. Ryan, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, United
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From the European Union:

Dr. Alexis Vahlas, Associate Professor, University
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nal and Internal Security of the EU*.

Andrzej Towpik, Ambassador of Poland to the
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David Leakey, CMG, CBE, Lieutenant General, British Army, Director General, European Union Military Staff (Brussels)

Fernando Valenzuela, Ambassador of Spain to Russia

Giampaolo Di Paola, Admiral, Italian Navy, Chairman, NATO Military Committee (Brussels)

Giovanni Manione, Brigadier General, Italian Army, Crisis Management & Planning Directorate, EU Military Staff, (Brussels)

Håkan Syrén, General, Swedish Army, Chairman, European Union Military Committee (Brussels)

Horst-Heinrich Brauss, General, Deputy Assistant Secretary General, Defense Policy & Planning, NATO (Brussels)

Jan Alhadeff, EU Crisis Management Planning Directorate (Brussels)

James Appathurai, NATO Spokesman, Strategic Director of Press Office (Brussels)

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, GCMG, former UK Ambassador to the United Nations

Jurgen Bornemann, Lieutenant General, German Army, Director General NATO International Military Staff

Karl-Heinz Lather, General, German Army, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, NATO (Mons, Belgium)

Mark C. Fischer, Transatlantic Center, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (Brussels)

Michael Ruehle, Head, Energy Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO (Brussels)

Patrick Nash, Lieutenant General, Irish Army, former Operation Commander, European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)

Patrick Chevallereau, Captain, French Navy, Executive Assistant, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO

Patrick de Rousiers, Lieutenant General, French Air Force, French Military Representative to the European Union Military Committee and the NATO Military Committee (Brussels)

Paul Van der Heijden, Colonel, Royal Netherlands Air Force, NATO Representative to the United Nations

Pedro Serrano, Ambassador and Acting Head of the EU Delegation to the United Nations

Shada Islam, Senior Program Executive, European Policy Studies (Brussels)

Stefani Weiss, Director, Europe's Future/Shaping Global Future, Brussels Office- Bertelsmann Stiftung

Stephane Abrial, General, French Air Force, Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, NATO

A.G.D. (Ton) Van Osch, Lieutenant General, Royal Netherlands Army, Director General, European Union Military Staff (Brussels)

Sverker Ulving, Colonel, Swedish Army, Minister Counselor, European Union Military Staff, Military Liaison Officer to the United Nations

From Russia:

Dmitry Rogozin, Ambassador to NATO (Brussels)

The author used these one-on-one conversations for basic research and to refine his ideas. But the conclusions presented in this report are entirely the author's, and it would be a mistake to link them to any particular interlocutor. Quotations used in the report without attribution are from these conversations.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: INTERSECTING TRAJECTORIES

INTRODUCTION

General Brent Scowcroft, dean of the American foreign policy establishment, has a deceptively simple test to determine whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is still relevant. His test is in the form of a question: "What is NATO for?"

It is a question that has bedeviled NATO since the 1989 demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. NATO has been searching for an answer to General Scowcroft's question for 2 decades. It has not yet found one. Set up in 1949 to defend against the threat of Soviet aggression, NATO today is increasingly dysfunctional, still searching for a new role 2 decades after the end of the Cold War. Cohesion used to be NATO's hallmark, but there is little of it left. The Eastern and Central European members still consider Russia to be their main threat, while the Western Europeans no longer do. Eastern and Central Europeans watch warily as Western European NATO members link their economies and trade with Russia.¹ The sale of an amphibious helicopter-carrying assault ship, the *Mistral*, by France to Russia is but one example of this breakdown in cohesion among the Alliance's members.

In 2008 Georgia and Russia fought a brief military engagement that almost led to the demolition of Georgia by Russian armed forces. A central part of Russia's battle strategy was to occupy and neutralize Georgia's

Black Sea naval base. An armored thrust rolled across Georgia and secured this objective in 26 hours. Were the Russia-Georgia conflict to break out again, the *Mistral* would let Russia capture Georgia's Black Sea naval installations in 45 minutes.² The *Mistral* represented the first weapons sale from a NATO country to Russia, and it is illustrative of the differing strategic perspectives of NATO's Western European members from Central and Eastern Europeans.

During a speaking engagement at an elite U.S. Army establishment, the author discovered this difference in perspective first hand. During the discussion period, an American participant asked the author why, if Georgia in 2008 was well on its way to NATO membership, did the United States not push NATO to take a more forceful stance against Russia. Before the author could respond, a German officer attending the establishment interjected that Germany would never have been part of such a plan and if the United States had insisted on involving NATO, America would have found itself isolated. He pointed out that Germany and Russia have the best of relations and Germany would not have jeopardized them.

NATO believed it had found its post Cold-War mission in 1999 by adopting an "out of area" strategy — transforming itself to be a world-cop — but this dream is dying a slow death in the mountains of Afghanistan, where many of NATO's European members avoid the main battles, and are packing up to go home, even as the war continues. NATO finds it difficult to even send noncombatants to the Afghan war to relieve the stress on American forces that do most of the fighting. The Alliance has, for instance, been unable to find the resources to supply half the number of trainers for Afghanistan that it promised 7 years ago,

even though the need for them is urgent.³ Yet, it now proposes to set up an integrated ballistic missile defense system to defend Europe against ballistic missile attack.

NATO's Declining Trajectory.

The American military has been losing confidence in NATO's capabilities for years. When the Alliance volunteered to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan after September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States summarily dismissed its offer and did the job by itself.⁴ NATO supposedly runs the Afghan war by being in charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). But no NATO official was present at President Barack Obama's side when he swore in the Alliance's new Afghan commander, General David Petraeus, after firing General Stanley McChrystal, the previous commander. Both actions were all-American affairs and left out NATO's top echelon—the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) who, under the NATO chain of command, is responsible for all the Alliance's operations. Neither was the NATO chain of command used to discipline and relieve General McChrystal of command.

Part of NATO's downwards trajectory is due to demographics. The officials that surrounded President Obama at that June swearing-in were of an age that gives them an instinctive appreciation of NATO's value. But what about younger American military officers who are now moving into senior military ranks? What do they think of NATO?

On a recent visit to a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, the author was seated at dinner between two senior naval officers whose ages differed by around 15 years. He

asked the older, the carrier's executive officer, what he thought about NATO. The answer was an emphatic endorsement of the Alliance. Later, when the author asked the same question of the younger commander of the carrier's attack squadrons, the answer was very different. "I remain to be convinced that NATO serves a useful purpose anymore."

This confusion is even more pronounced among Americans outside the military. "You mean NATO is still around?" a New York investment banker recently asked the author. The Dean of a college in Boston assured him that she was certain NATO was not a military force any more. "Probably just humanitarian assistance," she said. A retired college professor from Arizona asked if the author was sure NATO troops really serve in Afghanistan.

Common Security and Defense Policy's Rising Trajectory.

Through the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the European Union (EU) has already deployed 27 missions from Africa to Asia. Most were small, but, 2 years ago the EU sent a force of 3,700 European troops for a military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic. Even as the EU was engaged in Africa, it organized an anti-piracy naval flotilla that was twice the size of NATO's to patrol the Horn of Africa.⁵ Both of these operations illuminated the EU's ability to deploy and sustain military forces with a high level of interoperability. In the case of its African deployment, 10,000 soldiers from 26 countries were mobilized to allow the EU to transport and sustain a highly mobile force of 3,700 for a period of 19 months more than 3,000 miles from Brussels, Belgium.

The EU gave the operation commander robust rules of engagement, which he had to use at an early stage of the campaign. The force was challenged by organized military units within the first 30 days and fought them off in a determined show of force.

Three main reasons account for the European Union's growing military clout:

1. The EU is a governmental entity, so it can combine civilian, police, legal, and military resources to tailor holistic missions that are far better suited to winning hearts and minds than NATO, which is a military organization.

2. For its naval mission, the EU signed a treaty with Kenya that gives Kenyan authorities the right to prosecute captured pirates. EU legal and process teams follow up with help to improve the judicial system with experts and computers.⁶ EU missions overcome the objections some countries have to American-led NATO forces on their territory. In the case of the EU's deployment to Chad and the Central African Republic, the local governments had made it clear that a force comprised of Americans would not be acceptable.⁷

3. CSDP is European-owned and operated, consisting of Europeans making decisions in their countries' national interests, which are not always aligned with America's.

The Euro-Atlantic Security Space.

It is worth recalling that neither NATO nor the EU have a standing military force. Both organizations use soldiers and equipment from their member nations. The combined EU military assets are listed in Table 1.⁸ It is worth noting that 10 countries—the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the

Netherlands, Greece, Poland, Sweden, and Belgium – all members of both the EU and NATO – account for roughly 90 percent of EU defense spending.⁹

	1999: EU15	1999: EU27	2009: EU27	change '99-'09
<i>Defense Expenditure*</i>				
Total Expenditure (1997/2007)	€156.2 Bn	€162.9 Bn	€209.7 Bn	+ 29%
Expenditure / GDP (1997/2007)	2.1 %	2.1 %	1.7 %	- 19%
Budget / GDP (1998/2008)	1.7 %	1.8 %	1.4 %	- 22%
<i>Armed Forces</i>				
Total Active Military**	1,789,868	2,508,908	2,013,990	- 20%
Army	1,125,718	1,516,378	996,234	- 34%
Navy	281,450	327,400	222,313	- 32%
Air Force	381,605	538,925	345,153	- 36%
Conscripts	669,770	1,131,020	212,785	- 81%
<i>Equipment</i>				
<u>Land</u>				
Main Battle Tanks	10,827	17,814	9,823	- 45%
Armored Fighting Vehicles	6,851	10,622	7,951	- 25%
Armored Personnel Carriers	19,751	26,311	22,844	- 13%
<u>Aviation</u>				
Fixed Wing Aircraft	5,600	7,453	5,401	- 28%
Fighter Jets	2,684	3,835	2,410	- 37%
Transport (incl. tankers)	439	612	898	+ 47%
Helicopters	3,515	4,732	3,573	- 24%
Attack	1,000	1,312	826	- 37%
Combat Support	969	1,305	849	- 35%
Utility (incl. transport)	445	584	1,076	+ 84%
<u>Naval</u>				
Aircraft Carriers	6	6	7	+ 17%

Table 1. ESDP Military Capabilities 1999–2009.

	1999: EU15	1999: EU27	2009: EU27	change '99-'09
Destroyers	29	31	26	- 16%
Frigates	145	155	108	- 30%
Patrol and Coastal	314	521	811	+ 56%
Mine Warfare	208	296	243	- 18%
Amphibious	267	274	494	+ 80%

The estimates are taken from *The Military Balance 1999–2000* and *The Military Balance 2009*, both published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The 1999–2000 edition uses figures from November 1998, including for defense budgets – the exception is defense expenditure estimates that date from 1997. The 2009 edition uses figures from 2008, except for defense expenditure figures, which date from 2007.

* To calculate defense expenditure in euros, the 1997 total defense expenditure figures were calculated using the European Central Bank (ECB) fixed rates to the euro in 1999 where possible, or the earliest available annual average exchange rate provided by the ECB. For 2007 figures, where necessary, the ECB annual average exchange rates of the national currency to the euro were used.

** This figure also includes military police and paramilitary forces such as *Gendarmerie* and *Carabinieri*, as well as army, navy and air force estimates.

The editors wish to thank Charlotte Blommestijn for her research assistance in compiling this table.

Source: Daniel Keohane and Charlotte Blommestijn, "Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999," *Policy Brief 05*, Paris, France: European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2009, available from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf.

**Table 1. ESDP Military Capabilities 1999–2009.
(cont.)**

Both organizations have military staffs, committees, and headquarters that are located within a few miles of each other, but cannot officially collaborate because of interminable political issues between Cyprus and Turkey. This political issue is explained further in the Conclusions section.

This expensive duplication is largely paid for by European taxpayers since 26 out of 28 NATO members are European states (the NATO/EU overlap is shown in Table 2). In today's dire economic climate, when Europeans are slashing their defense budgets, it is hard to believe that these inefficiencies can long continue.

Country	European Union	NATO
Belgium	x	x
Bulgaria	x	x
Czech Republic	x	x
Denmark	x	x
Estonia	x	x
France	x	x
Germany	x	x
Greece	x	x
Hungary	x	x
Italy	x	x
Latvia	x	x
Lithuania	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x
Netherlands	x	x
Poland	x	x
Portugal	x	x

Table 2. Membership Overlap between the EU and NATO.

Country	European Union	NATO
Romania	x	x
Slovakia	x	x
Slovenia	x	x
Spain	x	x
United Kingdom	x	x
Albania		x
Canada		x
Croatia		x
Iceland		x
Norway		x
Turkey		x
United States		x
Austria		x
Cyprus		x
Finland		x
Ireland		x
Malta		x
Sweden		x

Note: NATO (28 members) and the EU (27 members) have 21 members in common.

Table 2. Membership Overlap between the EU and NATO. (cont.)

As the United States, its largest member and lynchpin, tires of the unending internal feuds between NATO's European members and the EU and, responding to the new geopolitical reality, increasingly shifts its focus to Asia, NATO risks becoming even more irrelevant to the security needs of the Euro-Atlantic area.¹⁰

NATO's *New Strategic Concept* Sidesteps Reality.

Unfortunately, the Group of Experts set up by NATO's Secretary General to advise him on NATO's *New Strategic Concept* (Stratcon) and the Stratcon itself chose to overlook both NATO's dysfunction and CSDP's strengths. Instead of a dramatic course correction in NATO's future mission statement to reconcile NATO and CSDP, the Stratcon chose to sidestep reality with statements such as:

NATO enters the second decade of the 21st century as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world. Looking ahead, the Alliance has ample grounds for confidence. NATO's role in maintaining the unity, security and freedom of the Euro-Atlantic region is ongoing. Its status as the globe's most successful political-military alliance is unchallenged.¹¹

It is this kind of sentimental thinking and the inability to face reality that has brought NATO to its present state.

After consulting with over 50 military and government leaders from the United States and Europe, this report recommends that NATO be bridged to CSDP and that Europeans take primary responsibility for their defense. NATO will get a new lease on life, and a bridged military alliance will at least ensure that the transatlantic allies remain connected for the times when Europe, the United States, and Canada wish to act together. It would be a pity to let NATO fade away, because we may then have to re-invent it someday and that will not be easy.

Structure of Report.

Regretfully, CSDP is a relatively unknown entity not only in American military, but also civilian, circles. A large part of the reason for this is lack of coverage in the mainstream media. But another part of the reason is an ongoing erroneous depiction of Europeans as loath to engage in military solutions after the success of setting up the European Union through painstaking negotiations.¹²

To correct the CSDP information deficit, the next two sections of this monograph cover CSDP. The next section provides a CSDP timeline and seeks to answer the question: where did CSDP come from? The following section provides a description of three CSDP missions. These deployments were selected to illuminate the EU's holistic approach to security and to show the difference between CSDP's capabilities and those of NATO. Finally, the last section outlines policy options to bridge CSDP and NATO and sets forth recommendations for U.S. military and civilian policymakers.

THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY, 1999-2011

Background.

The origins of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)¹³ lie in the process that was used to transform Europe after World War II from a collection of independent European states into today's political-economic bloc called the European Union (EU).

The EU developed through a series of treaties that represent binding commitments by European states to give up national sovereignty over specific functions,

such as atomic energy, and coal and steel production, and to make these functions the responsibility of a supra-national governmental organization, the EU. It dates its founding to the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957. The important Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1993, coined the phrase "European Union" and defined the so-called "three pillars" on which the EU is based.¹⁴ The first pillar consolidated the communities and set up the groundwork for the euro; the second pillar established the EU's Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), which makes it possible for the European Union to take coordinated "European" action in foreign and security affairs; and the third pillar dealt with justice and home affairs policy.

CSDP is the operational part of CSFP. Though codified in EU law under the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, CSDP remained unused for a number of years. The trigger for activating CSDP was the Balkan conflicts (Bosnia, 1992-95, and Kosovo, 1999) of the 1990s. Even though these violent events took place in Europe's backyard, the Europeans found they were incapable of responding to them without the U.S. military and NATO. Specifically, The EU states discovered that there was no security mechanism within the EU besides NATO that European countries could use to forge political consensus among themselves for military action. There were no European facilities to plan, organize, and manage crisis management missions besides NATO. The result of this deficit meant the EU could not respond to an even purely European crisis without getting NATO and the United States involved. This was a wakeup call for the EU states.

Nothing could really take the place of NATO as long as Europe was minutes away from nuclear incineration by the Soviet Union. However, the end of the

Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed this threat. The realization that years after the Cold War ended and a half century after the end of World War II, there was still no European institution that could undertake these campaigns in Europe's own backyard was a frustrating and sobering reminder to the Europeans that they needed to put their security house in order.¹⁵

Britain and France change the EU's Security Equation.

Britain and France decided to change Europe's security deficit. At a meeting in Saint Malo, France, in December 1998, the two countries proposed aggressive steps to fire up the EU's dormant CSFP. This landmark agreement and call to action was labeled the St. Malo Declaration.¹⁶

In the Declaration, the two powers declared that "... The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. . . . To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide when to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."¹⁷

In a great leap forward, the two nations envisioned military actions in which NATO and the U.S. military might not be involved and in such instances they said that "... the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication. . . ." The joint declaration goes on to say that "... Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong

and competitive European defense industry and technology. . .”¹⁸

The Saint-Malo declaration was then enshrined in 1999 as the European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), which encompassed both *a specific policy and a set of dedicated institutions* that the EU could use to plan, approve, and execute joint “crisis-management” actions.¹⁹ (In December 2009, with the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP formally assumed its original name: Common Security and Defense Policy, or CSDP. For consistency, the author has used CSDP throughout this monograph.)

CSDP Institutions.

The institutions that the EU set up to execute its security and military missions are two committees that are mirror images of their counterparts in NATO: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is the policy making group, and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC is equivalent to NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EUMC to NATO’s Military Committee (MC). It is important to note that the PSC is a body of the Council of the EU, the highest level EU decisionmaking body representing the governments of the member states.

The EU also set up its own Military Staff (EUMS), a Situation Center (SITCEN) to provide intelligence and monitoring functions, and a Satellite Center (SATCEN) for mapping and positioning support. These institutions were embedded into the EU policymaking bureaucracy and are located in Brussels.

These CSDP structures also give the EU a firm foundation to build an even more robust security and defense structure in the future. The EU description of these entities follows:²⁰

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defense (CHODS) of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. The EUMC is chaired by a four-star general from one of the EU states. (Most CHODS are double-hatted with NATO's Military Committee.)

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of military and civilian experts seconded to the Council Secretariat by the Member States. It is chaired by a lieutenant general seconded from one of the EU states. The EUMS is the engine of CSDP.

Finally, the EU's **Satellite Center** based in Madrid, Spain, and the **Institute for Security Studies** based in Paris, France, were attached to the ESDP machinery to provide ESDP with mapping and analytical support.²¹ By 2003, the EU ESDP was operational with a military staff of around 200, which was still its size in 2010.

To provide a strategic framework for their security and defense policy, the EU adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003.²²

In 2004, the EU's **Defense Agency (EDA)** was set up to support the EU's member states in their efforts to improve military capabilities needed for the CSDP.

It does this by promoting research and development, armaments, and procurement cooperation and by working to strengthen the EU defense, technological, and industrial base.

Recognizing that crisis management operations in the future would require small, mobile units, in 2007 the EU set a target of organizing nine “battle groups.” A battle group in EU terminology is a combined arms grouping of around 1,500 personnel approximately the size of an infantry battalion or armored regiment. Specifically, it is the smallest force package capable of stand-alone operations, including the ability to contribute to an initial entry force.²³

The EU’s deployment goals aim for a battle group to be on the ground within 10 days of a European Council decision to launch an operation and be sustainable for 30 days initial operations extendable to at least 120 days. The Battle Group Concept reached full operational capability in 2007, and two battle groups have been on continuous readiness since that time.

CSDP has now been in operation for over a decade (1999-2011). During this time, the EU has used CSDP to deploy 27 military and/or civilian missions, in some cases to locations thousands of miles from Europe. It is worth noting that with the exception of one mission, all the deployments were planned and managed without any involvement with NATO’s facilities or the Alliance’s assets.

Table 3 shows the scope of these deployments as of May 2009. Note especially the number of deployments that the EU’s institutions are able to manage at one time.

			Duration in Days		
Title Operation Name	Location	Start	Start	Days	End
EUMM (Western Balkans)	EUMM		Jan-03	1826	Jan-08
EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	EUPM BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Jan-03	2312	May-09
CONCORDIA fYROM (Macedonia)	CONCORDIA fYROM	Macedonia	Apr-03	275	Jan-04
ARTEMIS DRC (Dem. Rep. of Congo)	ARTEMIS DRC	Dem. Rep. of Congo	Jun-03	92	Sep-03
EUPOL Proxima fYROM, succ. by EUPAT fYROM (Macedonia)	EUPOL Proxima fYROM, succ. By EUPAT fYROM	Macedonia	1-Dec	762	Jan-06
EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)	EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)		Jul-04	396	Aug-05
EUFOR ALTHEA BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	EUFOR ALTHEA BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dec-04	1612	May-09
EUPOL Kinshasa, succ. by EUPOL RD CONGO	EUPOL Kinshasa, succ. by EUPOL RD CONGO		Apr-05	821	Jul-07
EUSEC RD CONGO	EUSEC RD CONGO		Jun-05	1430	May-09
EUJUST LEX (Iraq)	EUJUST LEX (Iraq)		Jul-05	1400	May-09
AMIS EU Supporting Action (Sudan)	AMIS EU Supporting Action (Sudan)		Jul-05	914	Jan-08
AMM Aceh (Indonesia)	AMM Aceh	Indonesia	Sep-05	487	Jan-07
EUSR BST (Georgia)	EUSR BST	Georgia	Sep-05	1338	May-09
EUBAM Rafah (Gaza Strip)	EUBAM Rafah	Gaza Strip	Nov-05	1277	May-09
EUBAM (Ukraine- Moldova)	EUBAM (Ukraine-Moldova)		Dec-05	1247	May-09
EUPOL COPPS (Palestine)	EUPOL COPPS (Palestine)		Jan-06	1216	May-09
EUPAT (fYROM) (Macedonia)	EUPAT (fYROM)	Macedonia	Jan-06	181	Jul-06
EUPT (Kosovo)	EUPT (Kosovo)		Apr-06	822	Jul-08
EUFOR RD CONGO	EUFOR RD CONGO		Jul-06	153	Dec-06
EUPOL RD CONGO	EUPOL RD CONGO		Jul-07	670	May-09
EUPOL (Afghanistan)	EUPOL (Afghanistan)		Jul-07	670	May-09
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (Chad/Central African)	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA	Chad/Central African Republic	Feb-08	394	Mar-09
EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau)	EUSSR (Guinea-Bissau)		May-08	365	May-09
EULEX (Kosovo)	EULEX (Kosovo)		Jul-08	304	May-09
EUMM (Georgia)	EUMM (Georgia)		Oct-08	212	May-09
EUNAVCO, repl. by EU NAVFOR (Somalia)	EUNAVCO, repl. by EU NAVFOR (Somalia)		Sep-08	91	Dec-08
EUNAVFOR (Somalia)	EUNAVFOR (Somalia)		Dec-08	151	May-09




Table 3. CSDP Mission Deployments as of May 2009.

The Treaty of Lisbon.

On December 1, 2009, the EU foreign and security capability was significantly enhanced when the EU Treaty of Lisbon (Portugal)²⁴ came into force. Among its many features is the creation of a new position: The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a post that centralizes the responsibility for the EU diplomatic service, defense and security, and the distribution of development aid. The consolidation of these functions under one EU official gives the EU a powerful crisis management tool, akin to combining the U.S. Departments of State and

Defense.²⁵ If nonstate “winning hearts and minds” conflicts are the future of crisis management, the EU appears to be light-years ahead of NATO.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced two innovations into the EU’s foreign and security policy that lay the groundwork for even more control of Europe’s security by Europeans. These innovations are the mutual defense clause and the solidarity pledge. The former states that:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. (Title V, Article 42)²⁶

The solidarity pledge states that:

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States. . . . ”²⁷(Article 222, Title VII)

While the two clauses may not significantly alter the EU’s security landscape now, it is the author’s opinion that they are an indication of how the Europeans view the management of their security as the EU continues to coalesce into an ever more integrated entity.

The Question for U.S. Policymakers.

The last decade has dramatically altered the security arrangements that have existed in Europe since 1949. The question that now confronts American policymakers is: If NATO and American military assets are no longer necessary for security missions being launched by the EU around the world, what is the purpose of NATO?

As impressive as the growth of CSDP has been, its performance in the field is equally noteworthy. The next section provides an overview of three CSDP missions chosen to demonstrate the increasing maturity and complexity of the EU military-civilian crisis management capabilities and to illuminate the changed geopolitical Euro-Atlantic security environment to which NATO must adapt if it is to remain relevant.

EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN ACTION

During its first decade of existence, the EU deployed 27 missions²⁸ using its CSDP instruments. CSDP has evolved from the 1998 declaration of intent at St. Malo to an organization that the EU can and has used to deploy military and civilian missions thousands of miles from Brussels. An impressive achievement, especially considering that the evolution has had to navigate the shoals of EU decisionmaking that requires unanimity between a grouping of sovereign states to make unanimous decisions in a sensitive area – foreign and security policy.

Four aspects of the EU's missions are worth noting.

1. The geographic spread of these missions. CSDP has been used to plan and deploy missions over an area that stretches from Africa, through the Middle East, into Asia.²⁹

2. Sophistication of management and control. CSDP has evolved sufficiently already to control multiple missions at one time. Table 3 shows all the missions that were active during May 2009.

3. Civilian-Military mission coordination. Even before the Lisbon Treaty consolidated military, civilian, and development aid capabilities of the EU under one official—the Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—the EU was able to deploy and coordinate these resources in a number of missions. NAVFOR, the EU's first Naval mission, for instance, uses EU Navy warships and helicopters, lawyers, prosecutors, court administration specialists, computer advisors, and diplomats in a concerted effort to intercept pirates in the horn of Africa, capture them, and prosecute them.

4. Deploying where NATO cannot. EU missions have been able to deploy into countries that did not want a NATO presence in their country because NATO is viewed as an extension of American foreign and military policy. Two such missions—the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the military mission to Chad—are further analyzed in this monograph. Three of these CSDP deployments are described to illuminate the diversity of assets and skills that the EU has at its disposal for crisis management missions and illustrates the experience it has now accumulated by combining military as well as nonmilitary assets to achieve mission objectives.³⁰

The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM).³¹

Duration: September 15, 2005-December 15, 2006.

Location: Aceh province, Indonesia.

Total Cost: E15 million (\$22.5 million).³²

Mission Strength: 125 EU personnel and 93 ASEAN personnel.

Contributing States: 12 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) and seven third countries (Norway, Switzerland, and these Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) states: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and the Philippines).

Highlights of the Mission's Mandate. To monitor:

- The demobilization of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and monitor and assist in the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons;
- The redeployment of . . . Indonesian military and police;
- The reintegration of active GAM members into society;
- The human rights situation in the context of the above tasks; and,
- The process of legislation change in Aceh.

To rule on disputed amnesty cases, and to investigate and rule on violations of the mission's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU.)

Summary Discussion of Mission. From October 1976 until August 2005, the Indonesian province of Aceh was wracked by armed conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which sought Acehnese independence, and the Indonesian security forces, which sought to prevent such separation.

The AMM comprised monitors from the EU, Norway, and Switzerland, as well as five ASEAN countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore. This was the first such cooperation between the EU and another regional organization, and it was as successful as it was ground breaking. A senior NATO military official told the author both the Indonesian Government and members of the GAM had refused to allow either NATO or United Nations (UN) involvement in the Aceh mission. "They wanted the EU to handle this mission because the two sides in the conflict believed only the EU had credibility as a soft power with military strength," the official said.

AMM personnel comprised both civilians and military located at the mission's headquarters and in 11 district offices with mixed civil-military teams. The decommissioning teams were predominantly military and were also tasked primarily with monitoring the security aspects of the MOU such as decommissioning, demobilization, and redeployment. The civilian personnel of the AMM had diplomatic and managerial skills.

Results Achieved. The decommissioning of GAM weapons, the demobilization of GAM, the redeployment of the Indonesian security forces, and the facilitation of transition from conflict to peace in Aceh—a peace that still holds today. While the AMM demonstrated EU skills in coordinating military, civilian, legal, diplomatic, and development-aid instruments to fashion a successful crisis management intervention, its military component did not take center stage. The 2008-09 mission to the center of Africa, however, demonstrated the EU's ability to successfully mobilize, deploy, and sustain a mobile fighting force thousands of miles away from Brussels. Its area of operations,

250,000 square kilometers (96,525 square miles), was half the size of France.

Both in terms of cost and size, the African mission dwarfs the Aceh operation and underscores the EU's ability to scale its crisis management interventions to fit different needs. The mission underscored the credibility of the EU's military capability and was the largest and most demanding EU military mission to date.

As in the Aceh mission, the local governments had made it clear that they would not permit either NATO or the U.S. military forces to operate on their soil.³³

The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA).³⁴

Duration: March 15, 2008-December 15, 2009.

Location: Chad and the Central African Republic.

Total Cost: E1 billion (\$1.5 billion).

Mission Strength: 10,000 troops mobilized to deploy and maintain a force of 3,700 troops in theater over the duration of mission.

Contributing States: 23 contributing Member States (all but Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta) and three third countries (Russia, Albania, and Croatia).

Highlights of the mission's mandate:

- To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
- To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; and,
- To contribute to protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement

of its own staff and the UN and associated personnel.

*Summary Discussion of Mission:*³⁵ The EU military deployment to Chad (EUFOR TChad/RCA)³⁶ consisted of troops from 23 of the 27 EU states, and, significantly, three non-EU countries, Albania, Croatia, and Russia, whose forces were integrated under EU command. Albania and Croatia provided force protection platoons. Russia provided four heavy lift helicopters and their crews.³⁷

Under Irish and French command, the mission ran under the CSDP framework from March 2008 to April 2009. Authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution, the mission's objective was to protect more than 200,000 refugees from Darfur, and some 225,000 people displaced by internal fighting in Chad and the Central African Republic.

Irish Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was the operation commander of the mission and ran his command from the operational headquarters in Mont-Valerien, near Paris, while French Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Ganascia was the "in theater" force commander, in charge of the military forces on the ground. Elite Irish rangers supported by special operations forces from Austria, Belgium, France, and Sweden prepared four operating zones after the mission was approved by the EU and had received clearance by Chad and the Central African Republic in January 2008. The entire force was deployed and in operation by the summer.

The deployment was a significant military logistical operation considering that thousands of tons of military equipment, fuel, and water had to first be shipped to Douala, Cameroon, on the East African coast—a 2-week journey from Europe. Then supplies

had to be transported another 1,700 km to Chad, a distance equivalent to traveling from Rome to Stockholm, using containers, trucks, and other vehicles on rough roads. Camps had to be built from scratch in the middle of the desert to house the 3,700 troops.

To get to the operations zone in the center of Africa, an air bridge was established from Europe to N'Djamena, and a sea-land bridge was set up from the port city of Douala in the Cameroon to Chad. Ultimately, over 2,400 units (containers and vehicles) of equipment would be transported through Cameroon, and 540 air transport flights would fly troops and equipment directly from Europe to Chad.

Italian troops installed a field hospital with 15 air-conditioned interlinked tents containing operating rooms, x-ray equipment, a pharmacy, and a dentistry unit. To ensure that the insurgents understood early on that the Europeans meant business, multinational special force units carried out reconnaissance missions deep into hostile territory.

In order to minimize the loss of life, once the force was fully established, extensive operations using air and ground assets were undertaken to target specific areas of concern and to display the force's military capabilities. Long range patrols were sent throughout the area of operation to project EUFOR Tchad/RCA as a credible force with a significant deterrent effect. A coordinated information campaign underpinned the military deployment. UN personnel, who would ultimately take over from the EUFOR, were co-located in EUFOR's camps, and the military provided a security umbrella that enabled the deployment of the UN force after mission completion.

General Nash asked for and got extremely robust rules of engagement. He wanted the highest level of

rules he could get to ensure the mission was successful in completing its mandate and for the security of the soldiers. "I have no quibbles with the European Council in this respect because they approved what I wanted to do in Chad," the general told the author of this report.³⁸

Nash's military preparations proved prescient. The EU force found itself militarily engaged in the first month of the deployment. "There was a major altercation near the Sudanese border, I mean a major fire-fight," Nash told the author. "We had to bring in helicopters to support the troops and to extricate them. Our troops found themselves engaged against regular military units and lost one soldier in the engagement. "But we dealt with it strongly and taught them a good lesson," Nash said.³⁹

Within weeks after the first engagement, an Irish contingent was attacked by a well organized rebel force outside the town of Goz Beida, Chad. It was another serious fire-fight, and the rebel militia sustained a number of casualties. This was followed by a number of subsequent occasions when Belgian and Austrian troops fought off attacks in the North of Chad and killed a number of the enemy. Nash went out of his way to speak about the French and Polish troops attached to his force. They never hesitated to engage the enemy to defend the mission's mandate.

*Results Achieved.*⁴⁰ EUFOR Tchad/RCA met its objectives. On March 14, 2009, Transfer of Authority (ToA) documents were executed in theater, simultaneously in Chad and the Central African Republic. The ToA marked the handover of responsibility to a UN follow-on force, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINURCAT.

Upon the conclusion of the EU military mission, a significant number of EUFOR troop-contributing nations agreed to re-hat their troops to MINURCAT, thereby embedding a high level of continuity and experience into the UN follow-on force.

EUMM Georgia: The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia.⁴¹

The United States has traditionally played a central role in resolving military crises in Europe. This American monopoly ended on October 1, 2008, when the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia became operational. The conflict between Georgia and Russia marked a milestone in Euro-Atlantic security relations. Not only was the United States not a party to negotiating an end to the conflict, it does not play a role in monitoring the ceasefire. For the first time in recent history, a European conflict was ended by Europeans themselves. Of the 27 EU states, 24 participated in this mission.

Duration: September 15, 2008 – ongoing.

Location: Along the borders between undisputed Georgian territory on the one hand and the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other.

Budget: E49.6 million (\$74.40 million) 2008-10.

Mission Strength: 340.

Contributing states: 24 Member States (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the UK).

Highlights of the mission's mandate:

- Provide civilian monitoring of the conflict parties' behavior, including full compliance with the six-point agreement of August 12, 2008;

- Close cooperation with partners, namely the UN and the OSCE;
- Main objectives: long term stability throughout Georgia after the war; and,
- Tasks: stabilization, normalization, confidence building, and reporting.

Summary Discussion of Mission. The outbreak of hostilities between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Russia on August 7, 2008, paralyzed the international actors hitherto involved in conflict resolution in Georgia. In this situation, the EU under the French Presidency quickly moved in to close the gap.

On September 8, 2008, Russia and the EU concluded an additional agreement on the implementation of the six-point [ceasefire] plan.

The mission mandate by definition covers the whole of Georgia, hence including South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Within 2 weeks of the adoption of the Joint Agreement, the Union was able to establish the mission headquarters in Tbilisi and four regional offices and to deploy more than 200 monitors as well as technical and support staff.

The EUMM's monitoring activity is not limited to security developments in the narrow sense of the word. The mission mandate encompasses "soft areas" such as monitoring and reporting on the normalization of civil governance with a focus on the rule of law, human rights, and the humanitarian situation of the local population.

Results Achieved. The record speed of its implementation proved the EU capability to react quickly in a situation of serious crisis, provided that sufficient political will and strong leadership exists. Through the creation of the EUMM, the EU has considerably

increased its profile in conflict resolution. The mission has quickly delivered on its first and most prominent task, the stabilization of the situation after the war. The EUMM therefore represents a success for the CSDP.

The author made it a point to ask every European interlocutor for this analysis if they thought the EU was now able to defend Europe. Without exception, the answer was in the affirmative. With one caveat: *if we have the will*. American military power embedded in NATO has brought Europe from its weakened state after World War II to today, when it is hard to imagine a threat to the European homeland that cannot be met by the EU and its CSDP.

The question that must now be asked by U.S. policymakers is: given a robust, proven, and growing EU military-civilian capability in a benign European environment with no serious threat, what should be the future purpose of NATO?

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO used to be a tightly focused and effective military alliance, its members unified under the pressures of an existential threat from a nuclear armed and aggressive Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO's original reason for existence disappeared. The Soviet Union disintegrated years ago and the unity of purpose disappeared with it. NATO's dreams of being a world cop are withering in the mountains of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, over the last decade the EU security and defense establishment—Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)—has organized and deployed 27 successful military/civil missions from Africa to

Asia, including the EU's first ever naval force now operating in the Horn of Africa. Through CSDP, Europeans are increasingly taking charge of managing their own foreign and security policy. NATO is no longer the sole and preeminent Euro-Atlantic security actor.

As the EU continues its slow but steady march to – if not a United States of Europe, certainly a United Europe of ever closer States – its need to have security assets that reflect the EU's national interests will continue to grow. Increasingly, the EU will want and need to make security decisions without involving the United States in the process.

With the rise of the EU's CSDP and the downward trajectory of NATO, the security compact that has existed since 1949 between Europe and the United States – that America and NATO are central to the security of Europe – is increasingly obsolete. Meanwhile, cuts to the U.S. defense budget and the stress of two decade-long wars on America's military resources also underscore the need to recalibrate the Euro-Atlantic security relationship.

Policy Options.

Broadly speaking, the United States faces two policy options in responding to the Euro-Atlantic security developments laid out in this report:

1. Business as usual. Continue to believe that NATO, and the United States as NATO's leader, are indispensable for European security.

2. Bridge NATO with CSDP and re-mission NATO as a platform for Canada, the United States, and the EU to use *only* when the three decide a security threat exceeds the capacity of the EU's defense capabilities. This alternative assumes the EU will be responsible

for the day-to-day security needs of Europe, and action via NATO will be an unusual circumstance.

Ramifications of Options.

Using option 1 is the easy decision. No politically difficult choices need be made in choosing it. But it is the wrong choice. For reasons outlined herein, this choice will lead to an increasingly dysfunctional NATO and more friction between the Alliance members: between America and Europe but also between the European states. The choice of this option will result in further weakening NATO and the transatlantic relationship. In time, NATO may well be reduced to something akin to a discussion group, or, as the author believes, more likely it will simply fade away.

Option 2 is the option recommended to U.S. military and congressional decisionmakers. This option rests on the author's belief, based on his research and discussions with officials on both sides of the Atlantic, that Europe is increasingly capable of defending its periphery with the EU's CSDP. It no longer needs NATO or American troops for this purpose.

Although it removes NATO and U.S. forces from day-to-day European security concerns, this option leaves NATO and its operational bureaucracy in place, but bridged to CSDP. Under this option NATO's assets are freely available to support CSDP operations, and the assets are in place for Canada, the EU, and the United States to use in an extreme security event that threatens the entire Atlantic constituency.

Execution of Policy Recommendation #2.

The United States should take the initiative to implement the recommendation by inviting the Canadian Prime-Minister and the President of the European Council (or another EU official, or a group of EU officials nominated by the EC) to a top level meeting with two items on the agenda:

1. Endorse the recalibration of the Euro-Atlantic security relationship as described in option #2; and,
2. Authorize the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, the Canadian Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the EU High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy to put together an action plan to bridge CSDP and NATO.

The two biggest obstacles to combining CSDP and NATO are the political confrontation between Cyprus (supported by Greece) and Turkey, and the fact that the United States is not a member of the EU, which means America cannot be part of CSDP or the EU decisionmaking process.

The Cyprus-Turkey bottleneck can be summarized as follows. Cyprus is a member of the EU but not of NATO. Turkey is a member of NATO but not of the EU, which it aspires to join. A number of European states now oppose Turkey's accession to the EU, even though the EU invited Turkey to join as far back as 1987. As matters now stand, EU-NATO collaboration is vetoed by Turkey because Cyprus is not a NATO member, and Cyprus in turn responds by vetoing Turkey's EU aspirations.⁴² This state of affairs has persisted for some 7 years and shows no sign of being resolved through intra-European negotiations. The author believes the only way to overcome the bottleneck

is through direct involvement of the Canadian Prime Minister, the U.S. President, and the EU leadership.

The issue of the United States not being a member of the EU is an obstacle only if the United States insists on being involved in EU decisions that deal with European security and defense. Once the EU assumes responsibility for the defense of Europe's periphery, it is not necessary for the United States to be a party to internal EU decisionmaking.

As a part of the discussion to bridge CSDP and NATO, the transatlantic allies should negotiate procedures and structures to allow CSDP to use NATO's bureaucracy without the need to request permission from the United States. For example, while the EU does have a strategic planning capability embedded in its Military Staff, it does not have a permanent operational headquarters (OHQ) to convert a strategic plan with a broad political-military mission into actionable military objectives and to then exercise the command and control functions necessary to execute the mission. Due to political resistance (mainly, but not solely, from the United States and Britain), CSDP missions are deployed using an ad-hoc system of OHQs that are set up for each mission and dismantled after it.

Giving the EU responsibility for European defense would also require that the EU be able to set up a permanent OHQ to interface with its existing strategic planning capability. It may well be that the EU chooses to use NATO's long established OHQ at SHAPE as a kernel for its OHQ. The EU should be able to do this and use the OHQ without any need to involve the United States and Canada or seek their permission.

Perhaps, as a part of the negotiations to bridge CSDP and NATO a latent North American pillar could be established within the OHQ. Should Canada,

the EU, and the United States decide to act militarily together, this pillar would be operationalized.⁴³

Impact of Policy Recommendation.

On NATO. The biggest impact of implementing this report's recommendation will be to halt further deterioration of NATO's relevance to Euro-Atlantic security. The recommendation will help recalibrate the transatlantic security compact, and preserve an Alliance that has developed and perfected institutions to facilitate military operations between Canada, the EU, and the United States.

Were NATO to fade away, these institutions would have to be recreated before the three parties could act together to defend their interests in the event of an extraordinary threat that requires American superpower assets. It is doubtful if NATO or a like structure could again be created in time to meet such a threat.

There are political advantages to recalibrating NATO as described above in order to preserve it. Although Europeans are firmly opposed to NATO's war in Afghanistan and refused to participate in the Iraqi war, polling clearly shows the NATO brand is widely admired by citizens on both sides of the Atlantic.⁴⁴ Therefore, preserving NATO is in the best interest of the wider transatlantic relationship.

On the United States. As demonstrated in the following analysis by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), there is a tangible cost associated with the American commitment to defend Europe.

- The Department of Defense (DoD) Overseas Cost Report prepared by the CRS, shows that the cost for maintaining America's military presence in Europe in FY 2010 was around \$12 billion.⁴⁵

- In an earlier CRS report prepared during 1983-92, a period that included the Cold War, Congress required the DoD to account for the costs of U.S. forces available for the defense of Europe against the Soviet Union and its allies. Some of this information was made public and showed around 50 to 60 percent of America's defense budget (then, typically around \$150 billion) was allocated to the defense of Europe. That would mean \$75 billion-\$90 billion was allocated during 1983-92 for defending Europe.⁴⁶ The CRS qualified this analysis by adding the following caveat to its cost projections for the post Cold-War years.
 - In the post-Cold War era, the DoD has shifted away from a strategy focused on a U.S.-Soviet conflict in Europe to one focused on two major regional contingencies (MRCs). Given that all U.S. military forces are dedicated to fighting and winning first one and then, if necessary, two MRCs, any measure of the total costs of regional commitments simply would reflect DOD's top line—a requested \$257.8 billion in budget authority in FY1996. Thus, setting aside the issue of flaws in the methodology, in the post-Cold War era a calculation of total costs of regional commitments would provide no additional useful input to the burden sharing debate.⁴⁷

Without recourse to information on present American contingency plans to defend Europe (which are of necessity classified), it is not possible to further quantify the financial impact of implementing the report's recommendation. But it is safe to assert, based on the

two reports cited above, that there will be a reduction in defense expenditures allocated to the defense of Europe if this monograph's recommendation is adopted.

Adoption of this recommendation will also have an important indirect impact on the U.S. military that has been under stress for over a decade through continuous involvement in two wars. Europe's assumption of responsibility for its own defense can help reduce this stress level because it will result in a lowering of America's defense commitments.

The European Union. For the EU, the biggest impact of assuming responsibility for the defense of Europe will be in accelerating the efforts already under way to rationalize EU defense spending, which currently stands at around \$300 billion. These expenditures by the EU states and the EU's defense assets are shown in Table 2.

The financial crisis that has hobbled defense spending on both sides of the Atlantic is finally forcing the EU states to pool their defense capabilities. While the EU is comprised of 28 states, four of them—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—account for over 70 percent of the EU's defense spending. Britain and France alone comprise 43 percent and are projected to spend 65 percent of the EU's defense spending 2013.⁴⁸ During the last year, all four countries have begun to pool their defense assets and reduce their national defense expenditures.

Leading this charge are France and Britain, with their December 2010 decision to share their aircraft carrier, nuclear weapon, and cyber-warfare operations.⁴⁹ In February 2010, Germany renewed calls for an all-European Army to continue pooling EU resources.⁵⁰ The recommendation made here will act as a catalyst for accelerating this trend.

The Transatlantic Alliance. If there is one constant in transatlantic security relations, it is America's criticism of Europe's defense expenditures. The criticism does nothing but create more friction between the transatlantic allies. It is a perpetual thorn in American-European relations.

"If the Europeans did not increase their defense spending during the Cold War, they will certainly not do it today," General Håkan Syrén, Chairman of the EU Military Committee flatly put it to the author during the conversations for this monograph. The General sees no possibility of an increase in EU defense expenditures for the foreseeable future.

The recommendation made herein will change this narrative. Europe will spend what it feels is necessary for its own defense. The recommendation will also ease the continuing friction over the differing geopolitical threat perspectives of the EU and the United States, and make the transatlantic relationship smoother.⁵¹ In view of the continuing importance of the transatlantic relationship, this might be the biggest benefit of all resulting from the recommendation to bridge CSDP and NATO.⁵²

ENDNOTES

1. The EU is Russia's main trading partner, accounting for over half of its annual trade turnover and the majority of its foreign direct investment, information available from ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/russia/. Of the 27 EU countries, Germany, France, and Italy are the main trading partners, information available from www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/Balance-of-Trade.aspx?Symbol=RUB.

2. Doreen Carvajal, "French Deal To Sell Ships To Russians Is Criticized," *New York Times*, December 29, 2010. Recently released U.S. military and government articles refer to the emer-

gence of a so-called pro-Russian “gang of five” headed by France and Germany, and which includes Norway, the Netherlands, and Spain. This grouping is frequently supported by Portugal on key policy areas dealing with Russia. See Gerard O’Dwyer, “Better Ties For Norway, Russia Cause NATO Strain,” *Defense News*, February 23, 2011, available from www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5783978&c=EUR&s=TOP.

3. Judy Dempsey, “NATO Falls Far Short of Helping Afghans,” *New York Times*, February 4, 2010, available from www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/world/europe/05iht-nato.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y.

4. Sarwar Kashmeri, *NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete?* Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011, p. 8.

5. For a first hand account, see *Ibid.*

6. The EU NAVFOR relationship with Djibouti is a good example of how these arrangements complement the naval force’s objectives. See, for example, “EU NAVFOR supports a legal training course for regional countries in Djibouti,” available from www.eunavfor.eu/2010/10/eu-navfor-supports-a-legal-training-course-for-regional-countries-in-djibouti/.

7. Author’s personal conversation with EU officials who were part of the negotiation team for the Chad mission, officially, EU-FOR Tchad/CAR.

8. *European Security and Defense Policy, The First Ten Years*, Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2009, p. 81.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-98.

10. For a sense of the Europeans’ growing awareness of the U.S. changing geopolitical focus, see James Bliz, “Finland Urges EU to focus on its own defence,” *Financial Times*, November 15, 2010, p. 6; and “Pivotal Poland, Radek Sikorski, foreign minister of Poland, urges the West to look east,” *The Economist*, November 22, 2010, Europe Section.

11. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, available from www.nato.

int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf.

12. The often quoted phrase, “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus,” is typical of the still widely prevalent opinions in America about the EU’s supposed disdain for war. For the origins of this quote and related sentiments, see Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise And Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003.

13. As noted later, CSDP used to be called ESDP until December 2009.

14. *The European Union – A Guide for Americans*, Washington, DC: The Delegation of the European Commission to the USA, 2008.

15. David Armitage, “Soft Power in Hard Times: An American Perspective of ESDP after a Decade,” Washington, DC: Office of Analysis for Europe, U.S. Department of State, available from *www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers/armitage_10J.pdf*.

16. “Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defense,” St. Malo, France, December 4, 1998, available from *www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html*.

17. Antonio Missirolie, “ESDP – How it works,” Catholic University of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium, available from *www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/pols/documents/missirolie_ESDP_How_it_works.pdf*.

18. CSDP Structure and Instruments, available from European Union Website, *www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN*.

19. *Ibid*.

20. CSDP Structure and Instruments, available from *www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=279&lang=EN*.

21. *Ibid*.

22. European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe In A Better World," Brussels, Belgium, December 12, 2003, available from www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

23. Gustav Lindstrom, "Enter the EU Battlegroups," Chaillot Paper, No. 97, February 2007, Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies.

24. Available from europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm.

25. The EU External Action Service is described at eeas.europa.eu/background/index_en.htm; its provisional organization chart is available from eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_organisation_en.pdf. Note especially that the crisis management institutions report directly to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

26. Frances G. Burwell and Ludger Kühnhardt, "The Lisbon Treaty in Focus: Germany, the EU, Transatlantic Relations, and Beyond," by AICGS Policy Report 44, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 2010.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Depending on how they are counted, the number of missions deployed add up to 27 or 28. The author has chosen to use the lower number. The interactive chart referenced here provides a wealth of information on each mission and is available from www.csdpmmap.eu/mission-chart.

29. *Ibid.*

30. For descriptions of the three missions chosen for this chapter, I have relied on the exhaustive documentation provided in the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), *European Security & Defence Policy, The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, Paris, France, October 2009. The permission of the EUISS to let me make annotated use of their material is gratefully acknowledged. The organization's website is a portal for up-to-date information on the EU and its foreign and security policy, and is available from www.iss.europa.eu.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

32. For consistency, I have used \$1.5 per euro throughout this monograph.

33. The prohibition of NATO or U.S. military forces was confirmed to the author independently by two EU officials who had participated in negotiating the composition and operations of the mission with local African government officials. One was a senior military official, the other a high ranking diplomat.

34. An exhaustive description of the Chad mission may be found in Bjoern H. Seibert, *Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2010.

35. Sarwar A. Kashmeri, *NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete*, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011.

36. In ESDP protocol, the designator at the beginning of the mission's name reveals the kind of mission it is: EUPT or EUPOL for a police mission, EUJUST for a Rule of Law mission, EUFOR for a military mission, as in Chad, and so on. This mission also impacted the Central African Republic (CFA) but is far more often called the Chad mission, and I have adopted this name herein.

37. Besides permitting its incorporation into the EU's unified military command, the Russian force contribution is significant also because it took place during the Russia-Georgia conflict.

38. General Patrick Nash, personal interview with author.

39. *Ibid.*

40. EUFOR OHQ Tchad RCA, *Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA*, BCAC 80, 00450, Armees, France: Fort du Mont-Valérien.

41. *European Security and Defence Policy*, p. 379.

42. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Daniel Keohane, "Unblocking EU-NATO Cooperation," *Center of European Reform Bulletin* #48, June/July 2006, available from www.cer.org.uk/articles/48_keohane.html. For a more recent discussion, see Nicole Gnessoto, "The EU beyond appearances." This essay is a part of

What Do Europeans Want From NATO, Report No. 8, Paris, France: The EU Institute for Security Studies, November 2010, available from www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_8-What_do_Europeans_want_from_NATO.pdf.

43. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Luis Simon and Alexander Mattelaer, "Unity of Command – The Planning and Conduct of CSDP Operations," Egmont Paper, #41, January 2011, Brussels, Belgium: Royal Institute For International Relations.

44. *Transatlantic Trends 2010*, p. 18; *Transatlantic Trends 2009*, p. 15; The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

45. CRS Report, "Department of Defense FY 2010 Overseas Cost Report," CRS Recalculated From Yearly Data, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

46. Stephen Daggett, "Defense Budget: Alternative Measures of Costs of Military Commitments Abroad," CRS Report For Congress (95-726F), Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, June 16, 1995.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Ben Jones, "Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?" Occasional White Paper, #88, Paris, France: EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2011.

49. BBC News, November 2, 2010, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11672796.

50. "Germany Calls For EU Army," *The Trumpet.com*, February 2, 2010, available from www.thetrumpet.com/?q=6977.5479.0.0.

51. Sarwar A. Kashmeri, "This Rift is Different," Chap. 1, *America and Europe After 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide*, Rev. and Updated Ed., Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008.

52. German chancellor Angela Merkel spoke eloquently about the continuing relevance of, and need for, the transatlantic alliance

in Washington, DC, on receiving the Eric M. Warburg Award in Washington, DC, July 15, 2009, London, UK: *eGov Monitor*, available from www.egovmonitor.com/node/26349.

For me, the special feature of this transatlantic partnership is our sharing of the same fundamental values, meaning we do not have to endlessly debate our interpretation of human rights and respect for the dignity of the person. Our common ground is the sharing of these fundamental values—something that goes for every partnership between German Federal Chancellors and American Presidents, and likewise for partnerships all the way down to the level of members of parliament and local politicians in the states of the Union and the German Länder. The dignity of every individual human being is our Benchmark.

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